CG Common Ground | Shelby
The decision and the reasoningCompleted

The decision and the reasoning

A referral, two Shelby companies, two seats

Shelby came to me as a personal referral, and it turned into four phases of work over about four years, for two companies that share a name and not much else in the way they operate. Carroll Shelby International was the licensing arm, in Carson, California. Shelby American was the Las Vegas operation, where the cars are built. Tellus held a different seat in each state, and by my own count those phases came to about $14 million.

WhereShelby entityTellus's seat
California (Gardena address, City of Carson)Carroll Shelby International, the licensing arm: mural, store, museum and loungeGeneral contractor
Las Vegas, NevadaShelby American, where the cars are builtOwner's representative and construction manager

The first job was a mural on the side of one of their buildings, done with the care I would give a full building because the next job was riding on it. The California work grew from there. This report is about the second seat, because it is the one where the usual answer was not available and the reasoning had to do the work.

Shelby American was moving to a new building in Las Vegas. The move had a date on it that was not going to move. The people in it were a management team that builds cars for a living, not buildings, and wanted one accountable party in front of them; a set of trades, most of whom Tellus already knew from the California work; and a city building department that had never heard of us. The scope was a build-out of an existing structure, not ground-up construction, which matters more than it sounds, because a build-out's risks sit in sequencing and coordination rather than in the ground or the frame.

The standard answer to a commercial relocation is to hire a general contractor, take a lump sum or a guaranteed maximum price, and hold the contractor to the date. Shelby's team assumed that answer, and so did I, until I read the license. Tellus was not licensed as a contractor in Nevada. In California we would have been the general contractor and the question would never have come up. In Nevada the seat was closed to us.

What Shelby actually needed was narrower than a general contractor. They needed the trades bought out on time and on a real schedule of values, the sequence held day by day, the cost watched by someone who answered to them, and the city dealt with by someone who had done it before. That is a general contractor's coordination without a general contractor's price guarantee, and it turned out to be exactly the work I was already doing for them in California.

The license closed one door, not the job

There were three ways to get the building open, and the figure on the cover lays them side by side by who holds what. The first was the default: a Nevada general contractor on a lump sum or a GMP, holding the price, the warranty, the trades, the schedule, the city and the license, with Tellus stepping back. The second was a pass-through: a Nevada contractor of record holding the license and the paper, with Tellus alongside as owner's representative only. The third was owner-held multi-prime with an agency construction manager, which is the industry's name for what we did: Shelby contracts each trade directly, each trade works on its own Nevada license, and Tellus buys out, coordinates and schedules the work as the owner's agent without guaranteeing the price.

The default was slow and expensive in the currency that mattered. A general contractor who had never worked with these trades or this client would have needed weeks to bid, buy out and mobilize, on a job with a fixed opening. His onboarding was schedule cost, not just dollar cost. The pass-through was worse, not better: it kept a contractor's fee and a contractor's onboarding time on the job and gave Shelby a second layer of paper for the privilege, while the coordination still had to come from us.

The third option was only sane under conditions, and I checked them before I recommended it. The trades had to be known to us, because trade-direct with strangers under a hard date is a bet, not a plan. The scope had to be a build-out rather than new structure, because a build-out's failure modes are the ones coordination can catch. And the clock had to be real, because if the date could slide, a general contractor's onboarding costs nothing and his price guarantee is worth having. All three held.

Then the harder part, which is where most owner's representatives stop short. Removing the general contractor does not remove the general contractor's risk. It relocates it. Under a lump sum, if the trades run over, the contractor eats it; under our structure, Shelby did. Under a lump sum, if a trade defaults or a warranty fails, the owner has one bond and one phone number; under our structure, Shelby had a contract with each trade and would have to pursue each one on its own. I put that to Shelby as the specific trade it was, their exposure on those two lines in exchange for the contractor's layer coming off the cost and off the calendar, and not as a question about whether they wanted to save money. They took it, with their eyes open. That conversation is what made the structure a decision rather than an accident of licensing.

How I came at this one

The first question was which risks a general contractor is actually paid to hold, and where each one lands when he is not there, because a saving that is really a transfer is not a saving. That question fit because Shelby was buying certainty on a date, and I could only offer that honestly if I named what they were giving up to get it. The second question was what the date cost in days, not dollars, since a contractor's onboarding is measured in the first and priced in the second. The third was whether we knew the trades we were buying, because the whole structure rests on that.